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PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The petitioner below was Chicago Bridge and Iron
Company ("CBI").

The respondent was the Auditing Division of the

Utah State Tax Commission (MTax Commission").
other parties to the proceedings below.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Appeal is based on Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16, which jurisdiction is vested in this Court
exclusively pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Can the State of Utah levy a sales tax on

purchases of steel plate and other raw materials even though the
steel plate and other materials enter into and become an
ingredient or component part of a product manufactured in Utah
that is shipped as component parts for assembly outside the State
of Utah?
2.

Can the State of Utah levy a sales tax on steel

plate and other raw materials which enter into and become an
ingredient or component part of such a manufactured product even
though all states in which such manufactured products are
assembled, including Utah, impose a sales or use tax on the steel
plate and other raw materials?
3.

Can the State of Utah impose penalties on sales

tax deficiencies where there is a genuine disagreement by the
parties as to whether or not a tax is payable to Utah and where
there is no evidence of willful disregard of established law or
precedent?
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STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The standard of review applicable to each issue
presented by this Appeal is whether the Appellant has been
substantially prejudiced by the agency having erroneously
interpreted or applied the law.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 63-46b-16(4)(d).
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(4)(d), it is appropriate
for the reviewing court to review the agency's interpretation of
law as a question of law with no deference to the agency's view
of law.

The "correction of error" standard is appropriately

applied to such issues.

Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 790

P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(a) (Supp. 1985, accord Supp. 1984);
accord § 59-12-103(1)(a) (Supp. 1991):
From and after the effective date of this act there is
levied and there shall be collected and paid:
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible personal
property made within the state of Utah equivalent to
the following rates: (i) 4-5/8% from October 1, 1983,
through June 30, 1986, . . . of the purchase price paid
or charged . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985, accord Supp. 1984);
accord § 59-12-103(1)(1) (Supp. 1991):
There is levied and imposed an excise tax on:
(a) The storage, use, or other consumption in this
state of tangible personal property purchased for
storage, use, or other consumption in this state at the
rate of: (i) 4-5/8% from October 1, 1983, through June
30, 1986, . . . of the sales price of such property
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g) (Supp. 1984, accord Supp. 1985):
The storage, use or other consumption in this state of
the following tangible personal property is
specifically exempted from the tax imposed by this act:

(g) Property which enters into and becomes an
ingredient or component part of the property which a
person engaged in the business of manufacturing,
compounding for sale, profit or use manufactures or
compounds . . . .
Accord § 59-12-104(27) (Supp. 1991): The following
sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by
this chapter: . . . property purchased for resale in
this state, in the regular course of business, either
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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in its original form or as an ingredient or component
part of a manufactured or compounded product,
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-4(h) (Supp. 1984, accord Supp. 1985):
The storage, use or other consumption in this state of
the following tangible personal property is
specifically exempted from the tax imposed by this act:

(h) Property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to
some other state, or one of its subdivisions, or the
United States; provided that the state of Utah shall be
paid any difference between such tax paid and the tax
imposed by this act and the Uniform Local Sales and Use
Tax Law of Utah, except that no adjustment shall be
allowed if tax paid was greater than the tax imposed by
this act and the Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law of
Utah.
Accord § 59-12-104(28) (Supp. 1991): The following
sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by
this chapter: . . . property upon which a sales or use
tax was paid to some other state, or one of its
subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by
this part and Part 2, and no adjustment is allowed if
the tax paid was greater than the tax imposed by this
part and Part 2.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(33) (Supp. 1991):
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes
imposed by this chapter:

Sales of tangible personal property to persons within
this state that is subsequently shipped outside the
state and incorporated pursuant to contract into and
becomes a part of real property located outside of this
state, except to the extent that such other state or
political entity imposes a sales, use, gross receipts,
or other similar transaction excise tax on it against
which such other state or political entity allows a
credit for taxes imposed by this chapter.
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-401(3) (Supp. 1991):
(3) The penalty for underpayment of tax is as follows:
(a) If any underpayment of tax is due to negligence,
the penalty is 10% of the underpayment.
(b) If any underpayment of tax is due to intentional
disregard of law or rule, the penalty is 15% of the
underpayment.
(c) For intent to evade the tax, the penalty is the
greater of $500 per period or 50% of the tax due.
(d) If the underpayment is due to fraud with intent to
evade the tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 per
period or 100% of the underpayment.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves Utah sales taxes during the period
October 1, 1983 through December 31, 1985.

In this case,

taxpayer, Chicago Bridge & Iron Company ("CBI"), appeals from two
separate Orders from the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax
Commission").

The first order, entitled "Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision" ("Original Order"), is
dated February 13, 1991; the seconcf order, entitled "Order"
("Supplemental Order"), is dated May 7, 1991.
In its Original Order, the Tax Commission ruled that
purchases of steel plate and other raw materials by CBI in the
State of Utah were subject to sales tax in the State of Utah,
even though these materials were manufactured, pursuant to
specific contracts, into storage tanks, pressure vessels and
other large steel containers and equipment which were then
shipped out of the State of Utah for use or consumption out of
the State of Utah.

With only insignificant exceptions, all of

the steel plate and other raw materials at issue in this case
were purchased specifically to meet the requirements of
individual customer contracts; none of the steel plate or other
raw materials was purchased for inventory or to be manufactured
into items that would be considered as inventory of CBI. All of
the manufactured products were subject to sales or use tax in the

g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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state of destination.

In each case, sales or use tax was paid by

CBI to the state of destination.
In its Original Order, the Tax Commission found that
CBI was, in fact, engaged in the business of manufacturing, and,
therefore, was a manufacturer.

Notwithstanding that finding, the

Tax Commission ruled that in those cases where CBI both
manufactured and installed the manufactured products in a state
other than Utah, it did so as a real property contractor, and,
therefore, was responsible for Utah sales tax at the time the
steel plate and other raw materials were purchased in Utah.
Specifically, the Tax Commission ruled that if CBI's contract
called for both manufacturing and assembly services, CBI was a
real property contractor; if the contract did not call for
assembly services, CBI was a manufacturer.
The Tax Commission further ruled that in those cases
where CBI was a "real property contractor,•' sales tax on steel
plate and other raw materials was first due on the purchase of
such steel plate and other raw materials in Utah, and payment of
use tax to California and other states did not relieve CBI of
liability for Utah sales tax, notwithstanding a specific
California Supreme Court ruling subjecting CBI to use tax in
California.
Subsequent to the Tax Commission's ruling, CBI filed a
Request for Reconsideration, dated March 4, 1991. That request
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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asked the Tax Commission to reconsider its Original Order in
light of its specific finding that CBI was a "manufacturer."

The

request also asked for a recalculation of deficiency in
accordance with the ruling of the Tax Commission as to those
contracts where assembly services were not performed.

Finally,

the request asked for a ruling on whether penalties should be
imposed upon CBI. The issue of penalties, although argued before
the Tax Commission, was not addressed in the Original Order.
On May 7, 1991, the Tax Commission issued the
Supplemental Order in response to CBI's Request for
Reconsideration.

The Supplemental Order was limited to a finding

that there was insufficient evidence to justify the 50% penalty
originally assessed by the Audit Division.

The Tax Commission,

instead, imposed a 15% penalty on the deficiency as recalculated
by the Audit Division, finding that CBI had apparently
intentionally disregarded established law or rule.

The

Supplemental Order did not, however, address CBI's request for a
reconsideration of the Tax Commission's finding on the
deficiencies themselves.
FACTS
The following facts were established by testimony and
documentary evidence at the hearing.
CBI's primary business activity involves the custom
design, engineering, manufacture, and, in most cases, field
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w5i
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assembly of large all-welded steel plate water storage tanks,
petroleum and chemical storage tanks, low-temperature pressure
vessels for liquefied gases, waste water treatment equipment,
pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large metal structures for
the storage, processing, mixing or blending of materials.
(Transcript at pages 24-29.)

(These manufactured products are

sometimes collectively referred to hereinafter as "tanksft.)
During the period in question, CBI operated a
manufacturing facility in Salt Lake City, Utah.
pages 16-17.)

(Transcript at

(In addition, CBI operated manufacturing

facilities at Birmingham and Cordova, Alabama; Fontana,
California; New Castle, Delaware; Kankakee, Illinois; and
Memphis, Tennessee).
Due to the nature of the tanks and other products CBI
manufactures, CBI often finds it necessary to include the
assembly on the customer's premises of the products it
manufactures.

As a result, after the tanks have been

manufactured, they are shipped in subassembled form by rail or
flatbed truck to their final destination, where CBI's field
assembly crews or the customer employees assemble and weld the
various component parts which comprise the finished tank.
(Transcript at pages 22-23.)
Except for assembly and welding labor performed at the
customer's assembly site, most, if not all, of the activities
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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performed by CBI with respect to the manufactured products at
issue were rendered at its manufacturing facility.

(Transcript

at pages 10, 21-22; Brief of Petitioner to Tax Commission at page

Under a typical contract, the steel plate pieces that
comprise the tank are cut, rolled, and manufactured into the
component parts (subassemblies) at CBI's manufacturing facility.
(Transcript at pages 22-23.)

Often, the manufactured products

are assembled (without welding the parts together) to make sure
everything fits, and are then disassembled so that they can be
shipped to their final destination to be assembled.
at pages 44-45.)

(Transcript

Rarely is any cutting, shaping or other

manufacturing activities be performed at the site of assembly.
(Transcript at pages 40-44.)
Typically, the manufacturing process consists of two
stages:

(1) the steel plate which has been custom ordered from a

steel mill consistent with the customer contract to specific
thickness and rectangular configurations is treated, cut, shaped
and welded together into component parts or subassemblies of a
final tank; and (2) these subassemblies are then heat treated
using high temperatures to relieve the stress created by the
welding and bending processes.

(Transcript at pages 7, 18-22.)

Transportation restrictions, the large size, shape or
other physical restrictions, prevent the tanks from being
gi\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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transported in their final and completed form.
pages 10, 23-24, 40.)

(Transcript at

But for the practical limitations of

transporting such large tanks, pressure vessels, etc., they would
be assembled and then shipped in their final form from the Salt
Lake facility (or other manufacturing facilities) to their
ultimate destination.

(Transcript at pages 23-24, 40.)

CBI's field assembly crews were run by a wholly
separate and distinct division from CBI's manufacturing facility
in Salt Lake City.

None of the assembly crews were headquartered

or permanently stationed in Utah.

The Salt Lake facility did not

perform, schedule or supervise any field assembly services.
(Transcript at pages 30-31, 37, 46-47.)

Occasionally, a third

party, or the customer itself, performed the field assembly
services.

Irrespective of whether CBI or a separate third party

performed the assembly services, generally the single major
expense under a contract was the manufacturing of the component
parts.
Although not at issue in this case, because the Tax
Commission has conceded this issue, during the period in
question, approximately 50% of the work performed at CBI's Salt
Lake City facility was for a contract on the Golden Gate Bridge
in which CBI provided manufacturing services only.
at pages 34, 43.)

g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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(Transcript

During the period in question, CBI purchased its steel
plate from vendors located within the State of Utah.
at page 7.)

(Transcript

Sales tax was paid on all purchases of materials and

supplies which were consumed in the manufacturing process itself.
Sales tax was also paid on all purchases of steel plate and other
raw materials for tanks that were assembled and installed in the
State of Utah.

In cases where the tanks were assembled outside

the State of Utah, sales tax was not paid to the Utah steel
vendors.

Rather, CBI paid a use tax to the state where the tank

was ultimately assembled and installed.

During the period in

question, the majority of the contracts for manufacture and
assembly were with customers in California.

In California, CBI

was required to pay use tax on the basis of the purchase price of
the steel plate and other raw materials that were ultimately
incorporated into tanks in California.

(Transcript at pages 7-8,

11-12.)
During the period in question, the Utah Code provided
exemptions for purchases of tangible personal property that
enters into and becomes an ingredient or component part of a
manufactured product and for purchases of tangible property where
a sales or use tax is properly paid to another state.
(Transcript at pages 9, 11.)
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

CBI's activities at the Salt Lake City facility

consisted exclusively of manufacturing tanks, spherical pressure
vessels, storage containers, and other personal property and, as
such, its purchases of steel plate and other raw materials were
exempt from Utah sales tax.
2.

Because CBI was required to pay use tax to the

state of final destination of its tanks, spherical pressure
vessels, storage containers and other manufactured personal
property, the Tax Commission's position is internally
inconsistent with federal constitutional precedents and results
in double taxation*
3.

Even if sales tax is found properly payable to the

State of Utah, it is improper for the Tax Commission to impose
penalties on any deficiency, since there is no evidence that CBI
willfully disregarded any established precedent or law.

In fact,

CBI's treatment of sales and use taxes was consistent with
established California case law that specifically examined the
transactions at issue in this case, and with United States
Supreme Court precedent.

gs\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
09/16/91

8

ARGUMENT
A*

CBI'S PURCHASES WERE EXEMPT PROM UTAH SALES TAX
BECAUSE THEY WERE OF STEEL PLATE AND RAW MATERIALS
THAT ENTERED INTO AND BECAME A COMPONENT PART OF
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS.

CBI's purchases of steel plate and other raw materials
from Utah vendors were exempt from Utah sales tax by virtue of
Utah Code Ann, § 59-16-4(g), the statute in effect during the
time period at issue in this case.

That statute exempted from

Utah sales and use taxes the following purchases:
Property which enters into and becomes an ingredient or
component part of property which a person engaged in
the business of manufacturing, compounding for sale,
profit or use manufactures or compounds . . . .
Accord, Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(27) (Supp. 1991).
The facts relevant to this exemption were established
by uncontroverted evidence at the hearing.

Those facts are as

follows:
1.

CBI is a manufacturer of large all-welded steel

plate water storage tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks,
low-temperature pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water
treatment equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large
metal structures for the storage, processing, mixing or blending
of materials.
2.

(Transcript at pages 24-29.)
The Salt Lake facility was built exclusively for

manufacturing steel plate into such tanks, spherical pressure

g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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vessels, storage containers, and other products.

(Transcript at

pages 16-17. )
3.

The equipment housed at the Salt Lake facility was

designed and used exclusively for manufacturing steel plate into
such tanks, spherical pressure vessels, storage containers, and
other products.
4.

(Transcript at page 17.)

Neither the Salt Lake facility and the equipment

located in it, nor the personnel at the Salt Lake facility, were
ever used to assemble and install manufactured tanks, either
within Utah or outside of Utah.

(Transcript at pages 30-31, 37,

46-47.)
5.

The functions performed at the Salt Lake facility

consisted solely of manufacturing large steel plate water storage
tanks, petroleum and chemical storage tanks, low-temperature
pressure vessels for liquefied gases, waste water treatment
equipment, pulp and woodyard equipment, and other large metal
structures, and, during the period in question, decking for the
Golden Gate Bridge.
6.

(Transcript at pages 21-22.)

But for the practical constraints of transporting

such large tanks, CBI would have assembled and shipped them in
completed form to their final destinations.

(Transcript at pages

10, 23-24, 40.)
7.

On occasion, tanks that have been assembled and

erected at a customer's site are later disassembled, transported
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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to another location, and reassembled, although never by CBI
personnel from the Salt Lake facility.
8*

(Transcript at page 45.)

The Audit Division of the Tax Commission concedes

that if CBI is a manufacturer, its purchases of steel plate are
exempt from sales and use taxes in Utah.

(Transcript at page

62.)
The uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing
showed that CBI's activities at its Salt Lake facility consisted
exclusively of manufacturing.

The Audit Division presented no

evidence that CBI's activities at its Salt Lake facility
consisted of anything but manufacturing tanks, spherical pressure
vessels, etc.

To the extent assembly activities took place

outside the Salt Lake facility, it was simply because the
manufactured tanks, spherical pressure vessels, etc. were too
large to ship in their completed form.

Final assembly at the

customer's site was never performed by CBI employees from the
Salt Lake facility.

To the extent practical constraints of

disassembly and transportation do not make it impractical, CBI's
tanks and other manufactured products can be, and sometimes are,
disassembled at a customer's "old" site, transported to a
customer's "new" site, and reassembled at the "new" site.
CBI respectfully submits that under the uncontested
facts of this case it qualifies for the exemption that existed
under Utah Code Ann. S 59-16-4(g) during the period in question,
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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and there is no reason that CBI should be disadvantaged simply
because of the enormous size of the tanks and other products it
manufactures.

CBI respectfully submits that if it manufactured

home hot water tanks and shipped them to other states where they
were installed in homes, the Audit Division would not seek to tax
the purchase of raw materials for manufacturing such home hot
water tanks, even though they become fixtures when installed and
are rarely, if ever, moved from one house to another.

CBI should

not be taxed on the purchase of raw materials that it
manufactures into similar, albeit larger, tanks, simply because
its tanks are larger than home hot water tanks.
B.

THE POSITION OF THE TAX COMMISSION IS INTERNALLY
INCONSISTENT AND WILL SUBJECT CBI TO DOUBLE
TAXATION.

The position of the Tax Commission also subjects CBI to
double taxation because, since 1941, the State of California has
required CBI to pay California use tax on materials purchased to
be manufactured into tanks, spherical pressure vessels, storage
containers, etc. that are used, stored or otherwise consumed in
California.

See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d

162, 119 P.2d 945 (1941).
In that case, the California Supreme Court ordered CBI
to pay use tax to California on tanks, spherical pressure
vessels, storage containers, etc. that were assembled and
installed in California.
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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Plaintiff, Chicago Bridge & Iron, is primarily a
manufacturer of tanks. It purchases the raw material
such as steel outside of California, and manufactures
the same into completed tanks at one of its plants,
also outside of California. It sells those tanks to
its customers in many parts of the United States. The
tanks are of such size, they cannot be transported in a
single unit, and for that reason, they are shipped,
"knocked down" and assembled and installed at their
destination. Due to the nature of the business and
other factors, the plaintiff finds it necessary in
making a sale of a tank to include the assembly of the
completed parts and the installation thereof on the
customer's premises. As expressed in the stipulation
of the parties, "the requirement of each * * * contract
(for a tank) that (plaintiff) assemble and install the
tank described in that contract * * * was relevant and
appropriate to and essentially connected with the
subject matter of that contract and inhered, and was
properly made to inhere, in the duty of performing the
contract". The "knocked down" tanks are shipped in
interstate commerce to plaintiff's representatives in
California, and are assembled and installed by crews of
skilled workmen which plaintiff sends from state to
state for that purpose. Under the typical contract
between plaintiff and one of its patrons the tanks are
to be assembled and attached to the buyer's real
property and title to the tank and all parts thereof
remain in the plaintiff until the contract price is
paid; the last payment on the price is to be made when
the tank has been completely installed and tested. The
tanks are manufactured by plaintiff pursuant to the
special order of plaintiff's customers.
119 P.2d at 946.
The California Supreme Court went on to find that:
It cannot be doubted that those materials which were
purchased by [CBI] to fabricate tanks specifically to
fulfill contracts or orders for tanks in California,
were purchased for use, storage, or other consumption
in this state.
Id. at 948.
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The California Supreme Court went on to hold that the
purchases of steel plate and raw materials for tanks installed in
California were subject to California use tax.
We conclude therefore that the materials were purchased
for use in California.
Id- at 949.
Because of this case, CBI had no choice but to pay use
tax to California on purchases of materials for manufacture into
tanks and other items that would be shipped to California for
assembly and installation.
purchases a second time.

The Tax Commission seeks to tax these
Such treatment is contrary to Utah Code

Ann. § 59-16-4(h); accord Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28).
Further, the decision of the Tax Commission is
internally inconsistent with its own position of taxing purchases
of personal property made outside Utah where such personal
property is shipped to Utah for use, storage or other consumption
in Utah.

In such cases, the Tax Commission would levy a use tax

on such purchases pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(1)
(Supp. 1991) (formerly Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a)).

See, e.g. ,

Butler v. State Tax Commfn of Utah, 13 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852
(1962); Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d
406, 360 P.2d 819 (1961).
This approach is also contrary to established federal
constitutional law.
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see also. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v, Brady. 430 U.S. 274
(1977).

As established in Complete Auto Transit, to be

constitutionally valid, a state excise tax must be fairly
apportioned.

430 U.S. at 279.

In determining whether a tax is

fairly apportioned, the Court will examine whether it is
internally consistent.

Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S.Ct. at 588.

"To

be internally consistent, a tax must be structured so that if
every State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation
would result."

.Id. at 589, citing Container Corp. of America v.

Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).

"[T]he internal

consistency test focuses on the text of the challenged statute
and hypothesizes a situation where other states have passed an
identical statute."

Goldberg v. Sweet, 109 S.Ct. at 589.

To be

internally consistent, under a state's taxing scheme, only one
state may tax each transaction.

In this case, the Tax

Commission's application of Utah's sales and use tax provisions
is internally inconsistent because the Tax Commission will tax
both:

(1) purchases of steel plate and raw materials outside the

State of Utah that become component parts of tanks that are
assembled and installed inside the State of Utah, and (2)
purchases of steel plate and other raw materials within the State
of Utah that become component parts of tanks that are assembled
and installed outside the State of Utah.
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CBI respectfully submits that the Tax Commission simply
cannot have it both ways; that is, tax both purchases of
materials for items that are manufactured in Utah and assembled
in other states, and items that are manufactured in other states
and assembled in Utah.
Finally, CBI believes that it is important to consider
that the Utah Legislature apparently recognized the very
inconsistency now represented by the Tax Commission's position
when in 1989 the Legislature enacted what is now Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-104(33).

That section provides an exemption from sales

and use taxes for the very purchases at issue in this case.

It

exempts:
sales of tangible personal property to persons within
this state that is subsequently shipped outside the
state and incorporated pursuant to contract into and
becomes a part of real property located outside of this
state, except to the extent that such other state or
political entity imposes a sales, use, or gross
receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax
thereon against which such other state or political
entity allows a credit for taxes imposed by this
chapter.
Had the facts presented in this case occurred in 1991
rather than 1983-1985, CBI submits that it is uncontested that
the purchases which the Tax Commission seeks to tax would be
exempt.
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C.

CBI SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO PENALTIES ON ANY
DEFICIENCIES ULTIMATELY DETERMINED TO BE DUE.

Section 59-1-401(3) of the Utah Code sets forth
penalties for underpayment of tax.

Those penalties are as

follows:
(a) If any underpayment of tax is due to negligence,
the penalty is 10% of the underpayment.
(b) If any underpayment of tax is due to intentional
disregard of law or rule, the penalty is 15% of the
underpayment.
(c) For intent to evade the tax, the penalty is the
greater of $500 per period or 50% of the tax due.
(d) If the underpayment is due to fraud with intent to
evade the tax, the penalty is the greater of $500 per
period or 100% of the underpayment.
CBI respectfully submits that there are no facts that
would support the imposition of penalties against CBI.
The Tax Commission found that the penalties provided in
subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d) relating to "intent to evade the
tax," and "fraud with intent to evade the tax," were not
applicable.

(Supplemental Order at page 2.)

CBI respectfully

submits that where CBI was following established California case
law (Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal.2d 162, 119
P.2d 945 (1941)), and where a statutory basis existed under Utah
law for CBI to treat such purchases as exempt purchases (Utah
Code Ann. § 59-16-4(g)), there can be no finding of "negligence"
or "intentional disregard of law or rule," as are required for
g:\wpc\082\00000134y.w51
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imposing penalties under subsections 59-1-401(3)(a) or
59-l-401(3)(b).
To date, the meanings of "negligence" or "intentional
disregard of law or rule," as set forth in subsections (3)(a) and
(3)(b) have not been interpreted in Utah.

Other states, however,

have held that the "negligence" standard in state tax cases
should be equated with the federal negligence standard, i.e.
"lack of reasonable cause," as set forth in Section 6651(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended ("Internal Revenue
Code").

See, e.g., Gathings v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 334,

533 P.2d 107 (1975); El Centro Villa v. Tax and Rev. Dept. of New
Mexico, 108 N.M. 795, 779 P.2d 982 (1989).
Section 6651(a) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes
penalties in situations where the taxpayer has failed to file a
tax return or to pay tax when due.

The section, however,

contains a safeguard provision prohibiting the imposition of
penalties if "it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable
cause and not due to willful neglect."

The federal income tax

regulations, in turn, test "reasonable cause" by an objective,
rather than a subjective standard.

That standard is:

taxpayer exercise ordinary business care and prudence?"

"Did the
See

Treas. Regs. § 301.6651-l(c)(1); In Re Brown, 743 F.2d 664, 669
(9th Circ. 1984).

There is also an immense body of litigation

involving taxpayer claims that a failure to file was "due to
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reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect."

E.g., U.S. v.

Boyle, 105 S.Ct. 687 (1985); Walter v. Comm'n of Int. Rev., 753
F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1985).
Further, in 1988, subsection (8) of Utah Code Ann.
S 59-1-401 was amended to read:

"Upon making a record of its

actions, and upon reasonable cause shown, the Commission may
waive, reduce, or compromise any of the penalties or interest
imposed under this part."

(Emphasis added.) Again, this

amendment has not yet been interpreted in Utah.

However, the

Utah Code does list as a collateral reference a citation to an
ALR annotation titled "What Constitutes 'Reasonable Cause' Under
State Statutes Imposing Penalty on Tax Payer for Failure to File
Timely Tax Return Unless Such Failure was Due to 'Reasonable
Cause.'"

The few cases collected in this annotation support the

general understanding that a showing of "reasonable cause"
precludes the imposition of a penalty on the taxpayer for failure
to file a timely tax return.

E.g., Armstrong's Inc. v. Iowa

Dept. of Revenue, 320 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1982); Genex/London, Inc.
v. Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals, 622 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1981); Du
Mont Ventilation Co. v. Department of Revenue, 425 N.E.2d 606
(111. 1981).
The "reasonable cause" protection of IRC § 6651(a) is
equally applicable to cases involving deficiency in tax, as well
as failure to file.

Since negligence is the antithesis of
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reasonable behavior, a showing of reasonable cause for the
underpayment negates the existence of negligence.

See Video Tape

Exchange v. Indiana Dept. of State Rev., 533 N.E.2d 1302 (Ind.
Tax 1989); Matter of Gravco Land Escrow, Ltd., 559 P.2d 264
(Hawaii 1977).
CBI respectfully submits that if it is found not to be
negligent, it cannot be liable for "intentional disregard of law
or rule."

Where established California case law required CBI to

pay use tax to California on purchases of steel plate and raw
materials manufactured into tanks, etc. that were assembled and
installed in California, and where there was statutory authority
in Utah for exempting such purchases from Utah sales tax, CBI's
payment of use taxes to California cannot be characterized as
"negligent" or "due to intentional disregard of law or rule."
Indeed, CBI did the only thing a person exercising "ordinary
business care and prudence" would do under such circumstances; it
obeyed the direct order of the California Supreme Court, which
order was in no way contrary to Utah law.

CBI submits that the

letter from the Tax Commission, dated February 29, 1984, upon
which the Tax Commission justified its assessment of penalties,
does not constitute established law or rule. Rather, it simply
shows that there was an honest difference of opinion.

CBI

respectfully submits that there are no facts that would support
the imposition of penalties against CBI.
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CONCLUSION
CBI respectfully submits that based upon the facts and
governing legal authority, the ruling of the Tax Commission
should be reversed and CBI be given the following relief:
1.

The imposition of sales tax by the Tax Commission

with respect to the purchase of steel plate and other raw
materials that were manufactured into tanks, pressure vessels,
and other structures that were then shipped, assembled, and
installed outside the State of Utah should be reversed.
2.

The case should be remanded to the Utah State Tax

Commission with instructions to refund the taxes and penalties,
including penalties and interest, previously paid by CBI.
3.

If sales tax is determined to be payable on such

purchases, the imposition of penalties by the Tax Commission on
any sales tax deficiencies should be reversed and the case should
be remanded to the Utah State Tax Commission with instructions to
refund penalties and interest on penalties previously paid by
CBI.
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DATED this 16th day of September, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By:
Robert A. Peterson(
Ronald G. Moffitt
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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Assistant Attorney General
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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